Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 12
Issue 1
SCIENCE FOR JUDGES I:
Papers on Toxicology and Epidemiology

Article 3

2003

Causation: An Epidemiologic Perspective (In Five
Parts)
Douglas L. Weed

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
Recommended Citation
Douglas L. Weed, Causation: An Epidemiologic Perspective (In Five Parts), 12 J. L. & Pol'y (2003).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol12/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

WEED.DOC

2/23/2004 7:05 PM

CAUSATION: AN EPIDEMIOLOGIC
PERSPECTIVE (IN FIVE PARTS)
Douglas L. Weed, M.D., Ph.D.*
I.

THERE ARE TWO SIDES TO EVERY QUESTION—PROTAGORAS

How much scientific evidence does it take to claim causation?
What kinds and characteristics of evidence are needed to claim that
an exposure causes a disease?
Epidemiology appears to be uniquely positioned to answer
these questions. Causation, after all, is an integral part of this key
public health discipline. As the first half of a common definition
states: “Epidemiology is the study of the distributions and (causal)
determinants of disease in populations.”1
Epidemiology’s search for disease causation has been a long
one. For nearly two centuries, we have examined why populations
suffer from cholera and tuberculosis, pellagra and scurvy, heart
disease and cancer, dementia, suicide, and AIDS, to name a few
examples. Significant progress has been made in our understanding
of why populations get sick and how their health can and has been
improved.2 Indeed, the main reason epidemiologists study
* Douglas L. Weed, M.D., Ph.D., is Dean, Education and Training, and
Chief, Office of Preventive Oncology, and Director, Cancer Prevention
Fellowship Program, Division of Cancer Prevention, National Cancer Institute,
Rockville, Maryland.
1
DICTIONARY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 62 (John M. Last ed., 4th ed. 2001).
2
ROBERT BEAGLEHOLE & RUTH BONITA, PUBLIC HEALTH AT THE
CROSSROADS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 13-43 (1997); CHRONIC DISEASE
EPIDEMIOLOGY AND CONTROL 1-26 (Ross C. Brownson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1998);
COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH, INSTITUTE OF
MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 1-18 (1988); JOHN DUFFY, THE
SANITARIANS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH (1992).
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causation is to use scientific knowledge to control disease (and
injuries) through preventive interventions. As the full definition in
the Dictionary of Epidemiology states, “Epidemiology is the study
of the distributions and (causal) determinants of disease in
populations and the application of this study to control health
problems.”3 Identify causes, remove them from the environment,
and prevent disease: this is the time-honored central mission of
epidemiology and all other public health disciplines.
What epidemiologists do not do is study disease causation in
order to assign responsibility for harm caused to individuals;
specific causation is not a traditional problem for epidemiologists.4
For judges, legal scholars, and others involved in toxic tort
litigation, however, the problem of specific causation is
paramount. Binding together these two views—one from the world
of epidemiology, the other from the law—is that both require an
answer to the problem of general causation. Put another way, there
are two sides to the questions of causation posed above, two very
different reasons for answering the same question: one for public
health decisions, the other for legal decisions.
My purpose in this paper is to describe how epidemiologists
make claims about general causation, how they practice causal
3

DICTIONARY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY, supra note 1, at 62 (emphasis added).
Definitions of epidemiology have undergone significant transformation in the
past thirty years. In the 1970s and 1980s, epidemiology was often defined
strictly as a science without reference to the public health application of the
knowledge gained by scientific study; in the 1990s, definitions of epidemiology
have emphasized the dual role of professional practitioners in scientific
investigation and in public health interventions. DOUGLAS L. WEED,
EPISTEMOLOGY AND ETHICS IN EPIDEMIOLOGY, in ETHICS AND EPIDEMIOLOGY
76-94 (Steven S. Coughlin & Tom L. Beauchamp eds., 1996); Douglas L. Weed
& Robert E. McKeown, Science and Social Responsibility in Public Health,
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP., 1804, 1805 (2003); Douglas L. Weed & Pamela J.
Mink, Roles and Responsibilities of Epidemiologists, ANNALS EPIDEMIOLOGY
67, 68 (2002).
4
LEON GORDIS, EPIDEMIOLOGY 286-87 (2000); Michael D. Green, D.
Mical Freedman & Leon Gordis, Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in FED.
JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 333 (2d ed.
2000), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sciman00.pdf/
$file/sciman00.pdf.
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inference. I will identify some important problems that exist in that
practice, and what the future holds for solving them.
II. HABIT IS THE ENORMOUS FLYWHEEL OF SOCIETY—WILLIAM
JAMES
What follows is a brief description of the practice of causal
inference in epidemiology, with the following simplifying
assumptions:
1. Scientific evidence to be assessed has been made available
through a systematic literature review.
2. A statistical association between the exposure (the purported
cause) and the disease (the purported effect) has been established
at a level of significance of p < 0.05.
3. All epidemiologic studies examined have measured all
known confounders (an unreasonable assumption in many
situations, but helpful for the purposes of this brief discussion).
4. Evidence from a randomized prevention trial is not available
for the exposure-disease association under scrutiny.
5. A quantitative meta-analysis could be carried out, but will
not be.
This situation well approximates what Austin Bradford Hill—
of Hill’s causal criteria fame—faced in his now-classic paper on
causal inference,5 published one year after the 1964 Surgeon
General’s Report on Smoking and Cancer, another key paper on
causal inference as it has been conceptualized and practiced in
epidemiology.6
From a systematic literature review, different types of scientific
evidence would emerge, including but not limited to laboratorybased “biological” studies, as well as several types of
epidemiologic studies, e.g., case-control and cohort.
Epidemiologists typically consider the potential biases in the

5

Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or
Causation?, 58 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 295, 295-300 (1965).
6
SURGEON GENERAL’S ADVISORY COMM. ON SMOKING & HEALTH, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH EDUC. & WELFARE, PUB. NO. 1103, SMOKING AND HEALTH
(1964) [hereinafter 1964 SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT].
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results of such studies as well as the potential role of unknown
confounders.7 If we can assume, however, for the sake of brevity in
this description, that bias is not likely to be responsible for the
results of these studies, then the practitioner of causal inference
moves to the next step in the process: the examination of the
summarized evidence in terms of Hill’s causal criteria. Excluding
“experimentation” (see assumption number 4 above), there are
eight such considerations:8
1. Consistency
2. Strength of association
3. Dose response (or biological gradient)
4. Biological plausibility
5. Coherence
6. Temporality
7. Specificity
8. Analogy
These so-called causal criteria—of which only “temporality” is
the only true criterion—are then “applied to” or “considered in the
light of” the evidence.
The first decision to be made by the user is the selection of the
7

Jennifer L. Kelsey, Diana B. Petitti & Abby C. King, Key Methodologic
Concepts and Issues, in APPLIED EPIDEMIOLOGY 35 (Ross C. Brownson & Diana
B. Pettiti eds., 1998); Kenneth J. Rothman & Sander Greenland, Precision and
Validity in Epidemiologic Studies, in MODERN EPIDEMIOLOGY 115-134 (2d ed.
1998).
8
These so-called “Hill’s criteria” emerged from a conversation in the
medical and public health literature that can be traced back at least as far as the
early nineteenth century in the works of Jakob Henle and Robert Koch, both of
whom discussed the nature of causation in terms of infectious diseases. See
Alfred S. Evans, Causation and Disease: a Chronological Journey, 108 AM. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY, 249, 249-58 (1978); ALFRED S. EVANS, CAUSATION AND
DISEASE (1993). The extension of this discussion to the causation of chronic
diseases—cancer, heart disease, mental illness, and diabetes, to name a few
examples—began around 1950 and continues through today. The practice of
causal inference, however, remains firmly rooted in the criteria proposed by
Austin Bradford Hill in 1965. DOUGLAS L. WEED, Causal and Preventive
Inference, in CANCER PREVENTION AND CONTROL 285 (Peter Greenwald,
Barnett S. Kramer & Douglas L. Weed eds., 1995); Douglas L. Weed & Lester
S. Gorelic, The Practice of Causal Inference in Cancer Epidemiology, 5
CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 303, 303-311 (1996).
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criteria. In cancer epidemiology, for example, the most likely
choice involves: consistency, strength, dose-response, and
biological plausibility, leaving behind coherence, specificity,
analogy, and (interestingly) temporality. In each individual
application, the user will select those he believes to be most
relevant.
After some written narrative discussion, typically a paragraph
or two for each of the criteria selected, the user of this method then
makes a claim about the extent to which the exposure and the
disease under question are causally related. Sometimes
recommendations regarding preventive interventions are also
included.
This is a bare-bones—but reasonably accurate—account of the
epidemiologic approach to causal inference. This is our habit, our
way of solving a very important professional problem.
III. ONLY THE WEARER KNOWS WHERE THE SHOE PINCHES—OLD
ENGLISH PROVERB
This description of the use of causal criteria could have
included the following, more complete, set of steps:
1. Selection of the Criteria (as mentioned above)
2. Prioritization of the Criteria Selected
3. Assigning a Rule of Inference to each Criterion
Studies of the practice of causal inference have shown that
epidemiologists rarely pay attention to the second and third steps
above.9 It is unfortunate but true that a practitioner can undertake
this practice precisely as described above10 without mentioning to
those who review, edit, and eventually read the causal assessment
9

See Weed & Gorelic, supra note 8, at 303-11; Douglas L. Weed &
Stephen D. Hursting, Biologic Plausibility in Causal Inference: Current Method
and Practice, 147 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 415 (1998); Douglas L. Weed,
Epidemiologic Evidence and Causal Inference, 14 HEMATOLOGY/ONCOLOGY
CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA 797 (2000); Douglas L. Weed, Methods in
Epidemiology and Public Health: Does Practice Match Theory?, 55 J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 104 (2001) [hereinafter Weed, Methods
in Epidemiology].
10
See supra Part II.

WEED.DOC

48

2/23/2004 7:05 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

in the peer-reviewed scientific literature, how these criteria are
being prioritized (other than some are included and others are not).
Similarly, it is exceedingly unusual for a practitioner to describe
the rules of inference assigned to each criterion prior to their
application. By “rules of inference” I mean the conditions under
which one will accept or not accept the criterion as having been
satisfied, or more likely satisfied. If, for example, the user of the
method believes that causation is extremely unlikely if the
summarized risk estimate—the relative risk estimate across the
studies collected—is less than 2.0, then a reasonable rule of
inference for that criterion, for that user, in that particular
circumstance, would be that “relative risk estimates less than 2.0
will be considered unlikely causal” or something along those lines.
The rules of inference used for the criterion of biological
plausibility are especially mysterious. Other criteria can be
similarly described.
In sum, the current user of causal inference methods in
epidemiology can select the criteria they wish, prioritize them in
any manner they wish, and assign rules of inferences to them
(implicitly) without ever mentioning them. While it is possible to
infer these various choices by careful reading, they need not be
stated anywhere in the paper.
It is also true—and at least as unfortunate—that in many
scientific journals, these sorts of causal assessments can occur
without a systematic review of the literature. The studies selected
for review may not, in these circumstances, represent those culled
from a larger set using stated inclusion and exclusion criteria.11
Add to this ever-accumulating pile of subjective features the
uncertainties stemming from loosening the overly simplistic
assumptions regarding statistical significance, confounding, and
bias, along with the potential (and documented) role of personal,
social, moral, and political values in decision making, and it is fair

11

Douglas L. Weed, On the Use of Causal Criteria, 26 INT’L J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 1137 (1997); Douglas L. Weed, Methodologic Guidelines for
Review Papers, 89 J. NAT’L CANCER INST., 6-7 (1997); Rosalind A. Breslow,
Sharon A. Ross & Douglas L. Weed, Quality of Reviews in Epidemiology, 88
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 475 (1998).
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to say that the current practice of causal inference is, at best in
trouble, and at worst in shambles.12
IV. ALL PROGRESS IS PRECARIOUS, AND THE SOLUTION OF ONE
PROBLEM BRINGS US FACE TO FACE WITH ANOTHER PROBLEM—
MARTIN LUTHER KING
Given the current situation, what is most impressive about
epidemiology’s role in the identification of potentially preventable
causes of illness and injury is that so much scientific and public
health progress has been made. Smoking is indeed a cause of lung
cancer, laryngea cancer, esophageal cancer, and bladder cancer.
Human Papillomavirus does cause cervical cancer and HIV causes
AIDS. The list of chemical carcinogens—asbestos, arsenic, aniline
dyes, diethylstilbestrol, and cadmium to cite a few examples—is
long. Radiation of many types is responsible for—causes skin
cancer, breast cancer, and other diseases. Put another way, I do not
want to give the reader of this brief paper the impression that the
methods of causal inference are irremediable. But serious problems
we do have.
What is to be done? Two approaches for improving the
situation can be identified: one empirical, the other theoretical.
A. An Empirical Approach to Improving the Current Practice
of Causal Inference
There are examples—call them “case studies”—of causal
associations in the historical record (i.e., the peer-reviewed
scientific literature) about which we can all agree on the outcome.
For each, we can describe the evidence—the studies and their
evidentiary characteristics—that existed at the time a causal claim
was first made or, alternatively, at the time a consensus about
causation was reached.
Smoking and cancer represents an excellent example. In 1964,
a committee of scientists organized by the Surgeon General of the
12

Douglas L. Weed, Underdetermination and Incommensurability in
Contemporary Epidemiology, 7 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 107 (1997).
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United States carefully collected, summarized, and examined the
evidence (in a manner remarkably more systematic than much of
what is published today in 2003!).13 They concluded that lung
cancer and laryngeal cancer were caused by smoking cigarettes.
Esophageal cancer and bladder cancer, however, were spared this
conclusion. In 1982, after eighteen years of additional research, a
new committee was formed, again under the auspices of the U.S.
Surgeon General. The same causal criteria from 1964 were applied
to a new (expanded) body of evidence with somewhat different
evidentiary characteristics. In the judgment of the committee,
esophageal cancer joined the ranks of those caused by smoking.14
How can this type of analysis assist us in improving the
practice of causal inference? Here’s just one example: Careful
study of the 1964 decision on esophageal cancer will allow us to
describe what evidence—as reflected in the causal criteria and
their rules of inference—was insufficient to make a causal claim.
Careful study of the 1982 decision on esophageal cancer (in which
the committee changed its mind about causation) will provide an
estimate of the cumulative amount and minimum characteristics of
evidence required to make a causal claim (for that committee).
In any such example of what we now consider to be a case of
“known” causation, the extent to which the observed level of
evidence—the kinds and characteristics of evidence—is
representative of other causal associations is a fair question.
Perhaps it would have been reasonable to claim causation with less
(perhaps much less) evidence. Nevertheless, such an approach can
provide empirical examples of the minimum level of evidence for
causation aligned with a particular exposure-disease causal
combination.
B. A Theoretical Approach to Improving the Practice of
Causal Inference
Alternatively, we may approach the research problem by
13

1964 SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 6.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, PUB. NO. 82-50179, THE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CANCER (1982).
14
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examining the causal criteria, their rules of inference, and their
prioritization of the criteria, in terms of connections to causal
definitions, hypotheses, and theories. Simply put, for a given
causal hypothesis or definition, what evidentiary conditions would
be expected? Very little work has been done on this question in
epidemiology.
On the other hand, setting out causal conditions based on what
we believe to be reasonable assumptions is a time-honored
approach in epidemiology and can be traced to the early discussion
of this topic in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Hill’s 1965 classic
paper is an excellent example of this approach.15 Each criterion is
considered separately. For example, the reasoning for consistency
goes like this: a causal association should be observed in different
study populations, using different methods, examined by different
investigators; it would be consistent, in other words. Here’s
another example: a causal association is a plausible association; to
put it another way, if a purported relationship goes against what we
know is biologically possible, then we would be less inclined to
call it causal. Similarly, a cause must precede its effect in time, the
essence of temporality. This approach is extremely popular in
epidemiology. Nearly everyone has their opinion on how the
criteria should be used. And these opinions are reflected in the high
level of subjectivity or personal preference discussed earlier in this
paper.
Greater objectivity can be achieved if the criteria can be linked
with general causal hypotheses (or general theories of causation or
causal definitions).16 Currently, we have several definitions of
causation to work with.17 Finally, the theoretical approach can be
linked with the case-based empirical approach described above.
Together, these two approaches are our best hope for progress in
this difficult yet critical arena.
V. MORNING COMES WHETHER YOU SET THE ALARM OR NOT—
15

Hill, supra note 5, at 295-300.
Weed, Methods in Epidemiology, supra note 9, at 104-10.
17
Mark Parascandola & Douglas L. Weed, Causation in Epidemiology, 55
J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 905 (2001).
16
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URSULA K. LEGUIN
In the end, my comments on general causation have been as
much about the fuzzy future as they are about the dizzy present or
the hazy past.
Epidemiologists have only recently recognized that their
practice of causal inference is seriously ill. For nearly fifty years,
ever since the so-called chronic diseases—cancer, heart disease,
diabetes, and mental illness emerged as foci for “modern”
epidemiology—we have (almost systematically) ignored how we
might improve the practice of causal inference. A few recent
studies have shown that this practice, after years of neglect, suffers
from a variety of ailments not uncommon for methods more
qualitative than quantitative, yet which aspire to provide morecertain-than-not results.
The methods of causal inference are often used uncritically and
are subject to unacceptable levels of subjectivity. Their results—
the causal claims and preventive recommendations—are
susceptible to the whims of personal preference, what philosophers
call “values.” Precisely opposite claims have emerged from
investigators using the same causal criteria on the same evidence.
It is no exaggeration to say that any epidemiologist who claims
he is an expert—that he can reliably make claims about
causation—is either hopelessly naïve or a flagrant prevaricator. As
noted earlier, I do not mean to suggest that prior claims about what
factors or exposures cause illnesses are incorrect. We—the public
health community—have made the right call in many situations.
What I am suggesting, on the other hand, is that we have failed to
use the past record of achievement in general causation to the
public’s advantage. Couple our reluctance to look back and gain
from our experience—our successes and failures—with our wellknown aversion to theoretical development, and it is not surprising
that we have made so little progress on a problem so central to our
discipline.
What is needed for causation in epidemiology—and the cliché
is unintended—is more research. Two approaches have been
described: one, like both legal and moral reasoning, emerges from
careful empirical study of recorded case studies; the second is a

WEED.DOC

2/23/2004 7:05 PM

PROVING CAUSATION

53

theoretical approach both more speculative and potentially more
generalizable.
The future comes to everyone at the same pace: sixty minutes
per hour. To best meet that future for the problems of general
causation, we must have the power to shape it through research and
its application, what epidemiologists do best.

